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ABSTRACT: A president’s ability to control the policy narrative
during a military intervention is crucial to maintaining public support,
especially when American blood might be shed. An examination of
policy narratives couching the military interventions in the Gulf War
and in Haiti reveal both the fragility of these narratives and the
importance of framing.

B

e it Roosevelt and infamy, Kennedy and Pax Americana, or
Reagan and a wall that needed tearing down, framing a policy
narrative with the right words can be critical to the legacy of
a president.1 Studies of successful framing of presidential messages
find repetition begets message penetration which begets impact. But
examples of failed presidential narratives are difficult to uncover for
one obvious reason: they failed to dominate. Nonetheless, studies of
unsuccessful framings and the policy implications thereof are important
for understanding the presidency, especially now in a fragmented media
environment when gauging the success of a narrative is more difficult.
Even today, the president makes no more compelling decision than
the one to risk the lives of American servicepeople. Consequently,
studying successful and unsuccessful presidential wartime message
framing can illuminate the importance of controlling narratives under
the highest of pressures.
This article explores two cases of presidents framing messages
addressing military interventions. Specifically, it examines George H.
W. Bush’s messaging regarding the Persian Gulf War and William J.
(Bill) Clinton’s messaging surrounding the invasion of Haiti following
that country’s 1991 coup. The authors contend an executive’s ability
to keep terminology dominant and forestall any counternarratives
is a measure of rhetorical success. Being on the defensive or
constantly having to reframe one’s message is a measure of failure.
Not all successful presidential framings will sway public support but
maintaining a consistent narrative about a crisis is itself a measure of
any administration’s efficacy.

Background

Frames are subtle changes in language that can have dramatic
impacts on public opinion by focusing attention on certain, select aspects

1. Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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of an event or issue.2 Historically, elites set news frames since their word
choices and perspectives are critical for journalists in the initial stages of
reporting any story.3 Well-known examples of framing in news coverage
include presenting a rally or protest as a matter of free speech versus a
public safety risk or using terminology like welfare instead of the more
sympathetic framing of assistance to the poor.4
Cognitive science has shown such linguistic choices impact how
information “encodes” in the brain and what becomes associated with
the topic.5 Specifically, the brain associates terminology and issues
because of recency or frequency: we associate B with A because we have
recently heard about B or because we think about B often.6
Creating a frame that will be adopted by the media in order that
a particular policy will be embraced by the public is highly beneficial
to a politician’s success. Competition between the press and politicians
over frames on domestic issues is common, but the press tends to more
readily accept politicians’ discourse on foreign policy.7 Cases of successful
counterframing of foreign policy should, therefore, be relatively rare—
on foreign policy especially, the framing game is the executive’s to lose.8

The Persian Gulf War

When the Gulf War began in August 1990, Bush condemned the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait calling it a “blatant use of military aggression

2. Robert M. Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House’s Frame after 9/11,”
Political Communication 20, no. 4 (2003): 415–32.
3. W. Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States,” Journal
of Communication 40, no. 2 (June 1990): 103–25.
4. Paul M. Sniderman and Sean M. Theriault, “The Structure of Political Argument and the
Logic of Issue Framing,” in Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Nonattitudes, Measurement Error and
Change, ed. William E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
133–64; Kenneth A. Rasinski, “The Effect of Question Wording on Public Support for Government
Spending,” Public Opinion Quarterly 53, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 388–94; and Dennis Chong and James N.
Druckman, “A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments,”
Journal of Communication 57, no. 1 (March 2007): 99–118.
5. Dietram A. Scheufele, “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects,” Journal of Communication
49, no. 1 (March 1999): 103–22, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x; and
Scheufele, “Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited: Another Look at Cognitive Effects
of Political Communication,” Mass Communication and Society 3, no. 2–3 (2000): 297–316, https://
doi.org/10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07.
6. John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818691; and David Domke, Dhavan V. Shah,
and Daniel B. Wackman, “Media Priming Effects: Accessibility, Association, and Activation,”
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 10, no. 1, (Spring 1998): 51–74, https://doi.org/10.1093
/ijpor/10.1.51.
7. John Zaller and Dennis Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper: U.S. Press Coverage of Foreign
Policy Crises, 1945–1991,” Political Communication 13, no. 4 (1996): 385–405, https://doi.org
/10.1080/10584609.1996.9963127; and Entman, “Cascading Activation.”
8. This research analyzes public statements of Bush and Clinton from August 1, 1990 to January
15, 1991, and from January 20, 1993 to September 18, 1994, respectively. The data represent all
official statements as documented in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, the official
collection of administration pronouncements. Scholars looking to replicate this collection can access
the papers at https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/ using key words like: “Persian Gulf Crisis,”
“unconditional withdrawal,” “military invasion,” or “military aggression.”
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and violation of the UN [United Nations] Charter.”9 Bush repeatedly
described the invasion as “naked aggression,” a “brutal act of aggression,”
and an “unprovoked invasion.”10 His word choices signaled to the public
how to understand what was occurring in the Persian Gulf—specifically,
Iraq had brutally attacked Kuwait without reason. Bush also established
that the United States was not responding to the crisis alone, but had
dispatched envoys to work with the UN and allies around the world to
convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This narrative would prove
important moving forward when Saddam Hussein later attempted to
introduce a counterframe that the conflict was a bilateral fight between
him and America.11
Early in the conflict, Bush spoke frequently about diplomatic
efforts to achieve his objectives for the conflict: Iraq’s complete and
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait’s
legitimate government, the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the
Persian Gulf, and the protection of US citizens abroad.12 Throughout
the first months of the Gulf War, Bush focused his language on these
objectives, successfully establishing a dominant initial frame for the
crisis and leaving little room for critics to introduce counternarratives.
Public opinion polls in August 1990 reveal Bush’s narrative and
rhetoric was successful: 60–75 percent of Americans were keeping
abreast of events and supported Bush’s policy.13 There were complications
though, as a majority also believed the United States was involved to
protect American economic interests in the Persian Gulf and a minority
believed the involvement was to deter Iraqi aggression.14 From August
1990 through January 1991, even when Bush was unable to convince a
majority of Americans about the justifications for US involvement in
the Persian Gulf, he was able to maintain a majority of support for US
military presence in Saudi Arabia.15 These polls suggest Bush’s framing
was working.
In November, Bush adjusted his narrative to gain support for military
intervention, building upon the existing framing to justify the use of
force. Bush emphasized lessons learned from World War II, repeatedly
drawing analogies between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler and
emphasizing the world could not appease aggressors.16 Bush continued
to express his desire for a nonmilitary resolution to the crisis, but now
added that UN Security Council resolutions had to be implemented.
9. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2,
July 1 to December 31, 1990 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and
Records Administration [NARA], 1991), 1082.
10. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1,
January 1 to June 30, 1990 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1991).
11. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2, 1082–183.
12. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2.
13. George Gallup Jr. and Frank Newport, “The Persian Gulf Crisis: American Opinion
throughout the Month of August,” Gallup Poll Monthly 299 (August 1990): 2.
14. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” 7.
15. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis.”
16. Bush, George Bush, 1990, bk. 2, 1148–256.
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Bush and his allies had a large hurdle to overcome before using
force: the concern over another Vietnam-like quagmire, which, in
August 1990, 48 percent of Americans admitted to fearing.17 Polls
indicate Bush overcame these fears by stressing American forces had
sufficient resources to overwhelm Iraqi forces and the administration
had every intention to depart the region quickly.18
As months passed, as a result of the framing of this narrative, Bush
succeeded in convincing a majority of Americans to support his policy
choices.19 By January 1991, almost two-thirds of Americans said they
had given a “great deal” of thought to whether the United States should
invade to retake Kuwait from Iraq, and over half reported supporting
military intervention.20
In addition, Bush’s many statements, news conferences, and
exchanges with reporters ensured three-fourths of Americans said they
understood why the United States was involved in the Persian Gulf.21
Polls show Bush’s statements brought public understanding in line
with his own reasons for US involvement: peace, security, and stability
in the region over access to oil supplies.22 Despite Saddam Hussein’s
counterframing efforts, public concerns that oil was the real reason for
the conflict, and worries about a second Vietnam, Bush successfully
controlled the narrative about the Gulf War until the invasion in 1991
and the commencement of Operation Desert Storm.

The 1991 Haiti Coup

In addition to establishing the policy narrative for the Gulf War, Bush
also established the narrative for the Haitian coup that ousted President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September 1991. From the beginning Bush
stated the United States was “worried about Haiti” and supported the
“restoration of the democratically elected government to Haiti.”23 He
also stated he was “wary of using US forces in the hemisphere” and he
hoped a resolution could be “done without any kind of force,” publicly
supporting efforts by the Organization of American States to resolve the

17. Gallup and Newport, “Persian Gulf Crisis,” 7.
18. Data from polls on Persian Gulf War in Gallup Poll Monthly from August 1990 to January
1991.
19. Adam Clymer, “War in the Gulf: Public Opinion; Poll Finds Deep Backing While Optimism
Fades,” New York Times, January 22, 1991, https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/22/us/war-in
-the-gulf-public-opinion-poll-finds-deep-backing-while-optimism-fades.html.
20. “Times Mirror News Index, January 1991,” Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
Poll Database, Pew Research Center, https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=237708
&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
21. “Buildup to War,” Gallup Poll Monthly 304 (January 1991): 21.
22. Data from polls in Gallup Poll Monthly from August 1990 to January 1991.
23. George H. W. Bush, George Bush, 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2,
July 1 to December 31, 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1992), 1246–646;
Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 1 to July
31, 1992 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1993); and Bush, George Bush,
1992–93, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1, 1992 to January 20, 1993
(Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, NARA, 1993).
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crisis.24 Bush’s narrative constrained US support in this crisis to diplomatic
efforts and economic sanctions against the illegal government.25
Throughout 1992, Bush narrowed his rhetoric, advocating for
Aristide’s return, continuing economic sanctions, and the repatriation
of refugees. Further, Bush’s statements made clear the United States
would not use force or send troops to restore democracy to Haiti or
Aristide to power.26 This policy position would change with Clinton. At
first, Clinton continued Bush’s narrative with little adjustment. But as
the crisis continued, Clinton tried to change the narrative to fit with his
own emerging policy.
Similar to Bush, Clinton’s policy narrative discussed the US
preference for restoring democracy in Haiti and returning Aristide
to power, as well as US efforts to support international negotiations
toward these ends. Clinton’s narrative however, referred to the US
“commitment” and “determination” to restore democracy to Haiti,
whereas Bush only said “worried” or “supported,” without committing
the country to any solution to the Haitian crisis.27
While seemingly minor, this variation in terminology, when applied
to policy decisions, makes a significant difference in public messaging.
Commitment and determination imply significantly different degrees of
willingness to work toward a policy goal than worried does. This was
the first of several differences between the two presidents’ framings
of the Haitian crisis. Other significant divergences included Clinton’s
decreased focus on the Haitian refugee policy, increased attention to
human rights, and stating Aristide had been elected by “two-thirds of
Haitian voters.”28 This messaging foreshadowed a policy shift and an
attempt to change how the public understood the crisis.
In overcoming Bush’s hands-off narrative to gain public support for
his own more interventionist policy, Clinton faced an uphill battle after
seeming to (at first) accept Bush’s more laissez-faire policy. Establishing
a foreign policy narrative is hard; changing one is even harder. Further,
Clinton did not deliver his Haiti narrative frequently or consistently,
mentioning Haiti on average three days per month throughout 1993.
24. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1247, 1263.
25. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1246–646; Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 1; and Bush,
George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 2.
26. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1646.
27. Bush, George Bush, 1991, bk. 2, 1246–646; Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 1, 376–908;
Bush, George Bush, 1992–93, bk. 2, 1954; William J. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 20 to July 31, 1993 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Federal Register, NARA, 1994), 55, 290, 309, 311; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1 to December 31, 1993 (Washington, DC: Office of
the Federal Register, NARA, 1994), 184, 1743, 1758, 1864; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, bk. 1, January 1 to July 31, 1994 (Washington, DC: Office
of the Federal Register, NARA, 1995), 1292; and Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, bk. 2, August 1 to December 31, 1994 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Federal Register, NARA, 1995).
28. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 1, 823, 832; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 2,
1730, 1731–2, 1744, 1764; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1; and Clinton, William J. Clinton,
1994, bk. 2, 1548.
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The consequence in terms of public opinion was clear: October 1993
polling indicated more Americans disapproved of Clinton’s handling of
Haiti than approved of it.29
In early May 1994, Clinton revealed a more forceful policy toward
Haiti by introducing two new phrases: “not ruling out any option[s]” and
“time for a new initiative.”30 He began emphasizing the length of the
coup—almost three years—and stated, “maybe we’ve let it run on a bit
too long.”31 He also harkened back to earlier narratives that two-thirds
of Haitian voters had elected Aristide and the US mission was to restore
democracy.32 Additionally, Clinton more frequently referred to the
fact that following the coup, Haiti was one of just two nondemocratic
countries in the hemisphere and therefore of significant strategic interest
to the United States.33 In fact, between May and August 1994, Clinton
began to include “defending democracy” as a specific US interest in his
increasingly hawkish narrative.
Nonetheless, he failed to outline specifically what US interests
or mission objectives were. For example, Clinton first talked about
Haiti being in the United States’ backyard, then walked back this
messaging.34 He talked about Haiti sending drugs and that it, like
Cuba, was a nondemocracy.35 During this period of a lack of specificity
and contradiction in the policy narrative, in July 1994, 50 percent of
survey respondents opposed the military intervention desired by the
Clinton administration.36
In an attempt to gain public support, Clinton made a flurry of public
statements in mid-September to update Americans on developments
and explain his policy decision. After Clinton addressed the nation on
September 15, 1994, support for an intervention increased somewhat,
possibly due to a rally-around-the-flag effect: Gallup reported 66
percent of Americans were convinced by Clinton’s arguments, but 43
percent disapproved of the way Clinton had handled the situation in
Haiti.37 These gains were temporary: by October, approval of Clinton’s
handling of the crisis fell to 54 percent.38 By February 1995, while 47
29. “International Policy Opinion Survey, October 1993,” Pew Research Center for the People
& the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020, https://www.people
-press.org/question-search/?qid=278345&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
30. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 859.
31. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 819.
32. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 1, 823, 832; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1993, bk. 2,
1730, 1731–2, 1744, 1764; Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1; and Clinton, William J. Clinton,
1994, bk. 2, 1548.
33. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954.
34. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954, 1217.
35. Clinton, William J. Clinton, 1994, bk. 1, 954.
36. “People, The Press & Politics Poll—New Political Landscapes, July 1994,” Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020,
https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=292467&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
37. David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, “After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor of Haiti
Invasion,” Gallup Poll Monthly 348 (September 1994): 16–17.
38. “The People & the Press Poll—Prelude to the Election October 1994,” Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press Poll Database, Pew Research Center, accessed April 2, 2020,
https://www.people-press.org/question-search/?qid=292638&pid=51&ccid=51#top.
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percent said they had approved of his handling of the crisis, 47 percent
also reported disapproval.39 Our analysis of Clinton’s framing of the
military intervention in Haiti concludes he failed to establish a policy
narrative convincing Americans that the seriousness of the Haitian crisis
warranted armed intervention.

Implications for Future Executives

A successful presidential policy narrative rallies domestic and
international support behind a policy decision. A strong narrative
successfully framed helps coalesce support for a policy and quiets
potential counternarratives. But such narratives and frames must remain
agile—media and communications theory reveal a presidential narrative
cannot be presented and then left alone. A successful narrative and frame,
repeated with some frequency, keeps the event relevant for the public.
These two case studies provide the following three insights:
•• Whenever possible, a president should establish a narrative early.
This timing is important for new initiatives or events and for
efforts to redirect an existing policy narrative—the sooner an
administration publicizes its version of events or policy position,
the better chance a message has of gaining traction.
•• The success of the narrative depends on how well an administration
conveys the relevancy of the issue in question. Presidents
employing consistent, sustained phraseology are more likely to
beget success than presidents using inconsistent, contradictory, or
confusing language.
•• A successful frame evolves with the situation but has consistent
foundations, and allows a president to establish national interests
and objectives. During the Gulf War, Bush established US interests
early and did not change them. Clinton did not do this—the
administration’s narrative regarding US strategic interest in Haiti
morphed multiple times.
Every administration faces messaging and optics problems. While
no one case can provide comprehensive instructions for all occasions,
executives would be well-served to study the messaging strategies of
Bush and Clinton in the examples above, one of successful control of a
presidential policy narrative and the other, a mishandling of the same.

39. “Policy Opinion Survey, October 1993.”

94

Parameters 50(2) Summer 2020

Samantha A. Taylor
Dr. Samantha A. Taylor is currently a visiting assistant professor in the
Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College.
Her expertise is in US military, diplomatic, and national security history from
1945 to 1998 and the relationship between policy, society, and the media.

Amanda B. Cronkhite
Dr. Amanda B. Cronkhite, a postdoctoral fellow at the US Army War College,
holds a PhD in political science from the University of Illinois. A former
foreign service officer with the US Department of State, her research focuses
on the role of media and information in politics and national security.

